Tolerance for Failure: Evidence from Patent Examination
Working Paper (joint work with Minrui Gong, University of Mannheim)
Presentations: Labor and Finance Group Spring Conference (Vanderbilt University), Fourth BCFM PhD Conference (Cologne), World Finance Conference
We introduce a novel firm-level measure of failure tolerance based on firms patenting histories. Specifically, we quantify failure tolerance as the worst patent examination outcome that is nevertheless followed by continued innovation along the same trajectory. Our results show that firms with greater failure tolerance tend to produce patents that are more valuable, more cited, more complex, yet also more likely to fail. At the same time, they file fewer patents and employ fewer inventors. Because higher quality comes at the expense of lower quantity, failure tolerance has little effect on firms overall innovation output. Exploiting inventor job switches, we provide causal evidence that higher failure tolerance increases inventor productivity. Taken together, our findings establish failure tolerance as a powerful incentive mechanism while also highlighting its overlooked costs.
